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The numerous rivers that meander through Central Asia’s rugged terrain of mountains, steppe 
and desert have for centuries shaped its socio-political and economic landscape. As different 
rulers have sought to demarcate political borders and establish varied systems of governance, 
water continues to link the diverse populations that now inhabit the newly independent Central 
Asian states of the former Soviet Union -- Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
and Uzbekistan.
1 Water also physically connects the Soviet successor states with their neighbors 
to the South, East and North. The Amu Darya or what once was referred to as the Oxus provides 
a vivid illustration. After originating in the mountains of northern Afghanistan and Tajikistan, 
the Amu Darya traverses the territory of Tajikistan before flowing downstream through 
Khorazm province in Uzbekistan and Dashhowuz province in Turkmenistan on its long journey 
toward the autonomous republic of Karakalpakstan, Uzbekistan before ultimately emptying into 
the Aral Sea. Historically, the intersection of rivers in Central Asia, such as the point where the 
Surkhan Darya enters the Amu Darya at Termez, has offered traders and pilgrims from India, 
Central Asia, and Russia a natural meeting place both to rest and exchange their wares (Soucek 
2000, 12). Other rivers such as the Irtysh River encapsulate Central Asia’s strategic location as a 
buffer zone between two of the world’s largest countries -- China to the east and Russia to the 
north, as its course takes it from the Altai Mountains in Xinjiang province in western China into 
Kazakhstan and then northwest to join the Ob River near Khanty-Mansiysk in Russian Siberia. 
Similarly, the Ili River connects China with Central Asia, as its path takes it from Xinjiang 
province in western China through eastern Kazakhstan before emptying into Lake Balkhash -- a 
major landlocked body of water in Central Asia.  
 
Surface water is the main source of drinking and agricultural water for the majority of Central 
Asia’s inhabitants owing to the presence of mountain glaciers that supply a large volume of melt 
water in the spring months. For centuries, Central Asia’s massive rivers have enabled both the 
sedentary and nomadic populations to inhabit and cultivate agriculture in the artificial oases that 
are sprinkled throughout the lower reaches of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers (Khazanov 
1992). Because Central Asia’s climate is largely arid and its water resources are unevenly 
distributed, its main urban centers have arisen in close proximity to its rivers. For example, the 
Zarafshon that originates in Tajikistan has provided the main source of drinking water for the 
                                                  
1During the Soviet period, these countries were, in fact, referred to as the Central Asian Republics (CAR) and 
Kazakhstan. After independence, Kazakhstan was also included in the definition of Central Asia. Afghanistan and 
western China are sometimes included as part of a more far-reaching Central Asia owing to the cultural, linguistic 
and religious similarities between the peoples.   3
majestic cities of Samarqand and Bukhoro that are located within Uzbekistan.
2 Yet at the same 
time, the dearth of water has contributed to the demise of other ancient communities. The Amu 
Darya did not always enter into the Aral Sea, but at one time flowed toward the Caspian Sea and 
supported the town of Old Urgench before it changed its course in 1576 and swerved back again 
toward the Aral Sea, resulting in Old Urgench’s downfall (Soucek 2000, 7).  
 
In short, water has for centuries been the main focal point for the Central Asia peoples, linking 
them physically, economically, and culturally. In fact, during the Soviet period, the region 
referred to as Central Asia largely coincided with the boundaries of the Aral Sea basin. 
However, when the Soviet Union broke up, new state borders ceased to coincide with the 
physical borders of the Aral Sea basin. Rather, the introduction of new political borders has 
transformed a large number of domestic rivers in the former Soviet Union into international 
rivers (e.g., Amu Darya, Syr Darya, Chu, Talas, and Zarafshon) and accordingly turned water 
into a source of potential interstate conflict. With the creation of the five independent Central 
Asian states, 18 transboundary rivers are currently shared between the Central Asian states 
and/or with its neighbors (See Appendix 1).  
 
This background paper examines the potential for conflict and cooperation within Central Asia 
fifteen years after the Soviet Union’s dissolution. First, it lays out the main axes of conflict that 
have emerged over water following the creation of five new sovereign nation-states. Second, it 
elucidates why early attempts at water cooperation have achieved limited success and provides 
insights into the underlying constraints that have precluded effective cooperation in Central 
Asia.
3 Third, this paper suggests that successful water cooperation in the region will only emerge 
when the following issues are adequately addressed: energy, Afghanistan, cotton, and other 
water problems outside of the Aral basin. Finally, it concludes with a few recommendations for 
fostering water cooperation.  
 
Central Asia’s Water Resources 
 
Central Asia is incredibly rich in water resources. Most of its rivers either drain into interior 
lakes or disappear into the desert through evaporation. Its two most well-known rivers are the 
Amu Darya (formerly called the Oxus) and the Syr Darya (formerly called the Jaxartes). They 
originate in the eastern mountains of Central Asia and then flow across the Kara Kum and Kyzyl 
Kum deserts, respectively, before emptying into the Aral Sea, a large terminal lake in the midst 
of the desert. The flow of the Amu Darya is 73 cubic kilometers per year and the flow of the Syr 
Darya is 37 cubic kilometers per year on average (Micklin 1991). The Aral Sea basin occupies 
approximately 1.8 million square kilometers, extending across Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Iran and Afghanistan (Micklin 2000, 1). Approximately 83 
percent of the basin resides in what was once part of the Soviet Union with the remaining 
percentage originating in Iran and Afghanistan (Micklin 2000, 1).  
 
The Amu Darya is formed by the Panj River in Afghanistan and the Vakhsh River in Tajikistan 
and then continues into Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and ultimately into the autonomous 
republic of Karakalpakstan in Uzbekistan before emptying into the Aral Sea. The Amu Darya 
                                                  
2 Historically, Samarqand and Bukoro were more closely tied to Tajikistan owing to their large Tajik populations. 
3 The Caspian basin is not discussed, as it is beyond the scope of this paper.   4
also receives a small contribution from the Kyzyl Suu, a small tributary in the southwestern part 
of Kyrgyzstan (FAO, http://www.fao.org/ag/agl/aglw/aquastat/countries/kyrgyzstan/index.stm). 
The Syr Darya is formed in the Tien Shan mountains in eastern Kyrgyzstan (known as the 
Naryn) and flows westward toward Uzbekistan through the Fergana Valley where it receives the 
Kara Darya near Andijon and then continues into Tajikistan near Khujand before it reenters 
Uzbekistan and passes by the capital Tashkent on its journey into Kazakhstan and ultimately 
emptying into the Aral Sea. The catchments of the following rivers also contribute to the Aral 
drainage basin: Zarafshon, Kashkadarya, Kafirnigan, Murghab, Tejen, Turgai, Sarysu, and Chu. 
The Zarafshon originates in the Pamir Mountains and then disappears into the Kyzyl Kum desert 
in Uzbekistan before reaching the Amu Darya. The Tejen with its small contribution to the Amu 
Darya basin forms the border between Afghanistan and Iran and then Iran and Turkmenistan 
before it disappears into the Kara Kum desert.  
 
The Aral Sea basin essentially defines Central Asia’s physical environment and political 
economy. In ancient times, Central Asia was often referred to as Transoxiana, which denoted the 
land between the two rivers (i.e., the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya). Until 1960, about 56 cubic 
kilometers of water flowed into the sea annually, but by the 1970s the Syr Darya no longer 
reached the Aral Sea and by the late 1980s the Amu Darya also ceased to flow into the Aral 
(Rakhimov 1990, 9). Massive water diversions for irrigated agriculture in the second half of the 
20
th century resulted in the desiccation of the Aral Sea and the calamitous pollution that still 
permeates the region. Where it once was the fourth largest lake in the world, by the late 1980s it 
had split into two separate water bodies – a "small" sea in the north and a "large" sea in the 
south. By 1991 sea level had fallen by about 15 meters, surface area had been reduced by one-
half, and the volume had diminished by two-thirds (Micklin 1992, 275).
 During this same period, 
salinity levels tripled, increasing from 10 grams per liter to over 30 grams per liter (Micklin 
1992).   
 
The ecological and health effects on the population are harrowing. Approximately 35 million 
people in the Soviet successor states live in the Aral basin of which 3.5 million live in the 
disaster zone that encompasses Karakalpakstan and the Khorazm region of Uzbekistan, 
Dashhowuz in Turkmenistan, Qyzlorda province in Kazakhstan (Vinogradov and Langford 
2001, 348). If Afghanistan is included in the basin, then another 8 million people live in the 
basin (Micklin 2000, 14). Dust storms that transport the toxic salt residue from the exposed sea 
bed have exacerbated the ecological and health crisis (Smith 1994). One of the most disturbing 
manifestations of the deteriorating ecological situation was the high rate of infant mortality 
during the Soviet period. Recorded rates in Karakalpakstan, Uzbekistan reached 60/1000 live 
births and 75/1000 live births on average in Dashhowuz, Turkmenistan (Vinogradov and 
Langford 2001, 348). More disconcerting is that even a decade after independence, there are still 
instances in which infant mortality rates have approached 100/1000 live births (Bucknall et al. 
2003, 8). In the downstream regions, the public health crisis remains omnipresent. For example, 
in Karakalpakstan some 70 percent of its 1.1 million people are ill and suffer from such chronic 
conditions that include respiratory illnesses, esophageal cancers, typhoid, paratyphoid, and 
hepatitis (Vinogradov and Langford 2001, 349).  Overuse of the waters from the Amu Darya and 
Syr Darya has contributed to the decimation of the downstream economy. The vibrant fishing 
industry that provided the mainstay of the population in Karakalpakstan has been wiped out 
because many of the native fish were unable to adapt to the rising levels of salinity. By the early   5
1980s, 20 of the 24 native fish species disappeared (IFAS, UNDP, and the World Bank 1997, 
23-24). The once booming fishing port of Muynak in Uzbekistan now resides 150 kilometers 
from the Aral shoreline (Glantz 2002, 25).  
 
Central Asia’s other less infamous water bodies are also highly polluted. In particular, the Irtysh 
River, which is a tributary of the Ob, has been classified as “very dirty” (ADB 1997, 38). The 
Irtysh is Kazakhstan’s main river and covers one-third of its territory (i.e., in northern and 
eastern Kazakhstan), providing water to three of its largest oblasts – East Kazakhstan, Pavlodar, 
and Semipalatinsk. These three oblasts are home to some of the largest water consuming 
enterprises that include non-ferrous metallurgy, chemical production, manufacturing, oil 
refining, and food production (ADB 1997). These enterprises are notorious for their toxic 
discharges into the river. 
 
Lake Balkhash, the final destination of the Ili River that flows from western China into 
Kazakhstan (through Almaty and Taldy-Kurgan Oblasts), is also heavily contaminated from 
industrial pollution and agricultural discharges. One of the main sources of pollution is the 
noxious discharge from Balkhashmed (Balkhash Copper) Production Company, which deposits 
copper, lead, and arsenic wastes into the lake (ADB 1997, 40).  The Ili is mainly used for 
agricultural purposes in Kazakhstan, and as a result, pesticide residues and mineral fertilizers 
discharged into the river have also raised the level of lake pollution (ADB 1997).  
                   
Axes of Water Conflict  
 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union shattered a highly centralized system of water management 
that had been in place for over a half century. During the Soviet period, authorities in Moscow 
managed the Aral Sea Basin as an integrated economic unit wherein the center (i.e., the Ministry 
for Land Reclamation and Water Resources or Minvodkhoz) determined water allocations and 
use from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers to advance its economic priorities. For the Central 
Asian republics, this meant cultivating 90 percent of the Soviet Union’s cotton (Micklin 1991, 
10-11).  
 
From the 1950s-1980s, Soviet planners erected an elaborate system of canals, reservoirs, and 
pumping stations to support cotton as the mainstay of the region’s economy. In Uzbekistan 
alone, they built approximately 170,000 kilometers of canals to irrigate 4.2 million hectares of 
land (IMF 1992, 1). The most notorious project, however, was the construction of the colossal 
Kara Kum Canal that diverts water from the Amu Darya and transports it across 1,400 
kilometers of desert in Turkmenistan. Irrigation is so vital to the region that a recent World Bank 
study noted that “without irrigation, much of the land would revert to desert scrub” (Bucknall et 
al. 2003, v). In fact, most of the cultivated land in Central Asia is irrigated: 75 percent of 
Kyrgyzstan’s cultivated land is irrigated, 84 percent of Tajikistan’s, 89 percent of Uzbekistan’s 
and 100 percent of Turkmenistan’s (ICG 2005, 28). Irrigated agriculture, furthermore, accounts 
for a substantial percentage of GDP in the Central Asian states; in 2003, it totaled 8 percent of 
GDP in Kazakhstan (most of which is in southern Kazakhstan), 23 percent in Tajikistan, 25 
percent in Turkmenistan, 35 percent in Uzbekistan and 39 percent in Kyrgyzstan (World Bank 
2005).  
   6
The vast system of water infrastructure physically linked different populations along the course 
of the rivers during the Soviet period. For example, upstream reservoirs and dams along the 
Naryn River in Kyrgyzstan (e.g., the Toktogul hydraulic complex) were connected to 
downstream irrigation systems at the farm level in both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Similarly, 
in the Amu Darya basin the upstream hydroelectric complexes on the Vakhsh River linked the 
irrigated lands in Tajikistan with other agricultural users in Turkmenistan and then with the 
downstream populations in Khorazm and Karakalpakstan in Uzbekistan.  The whole system, 
however, was assembled with the sole objective to promote regional economic specialization of 
cotton production in the downstream states and not toward the provision of hydroelectricity for 
upstream consumption.  
 
The Soviet Union’s collapse disrupted the economic basis upon which the water infrastructure 
was designed and brought to the fore new asymmetries of capabilities and competing interests 
between the upstream and downstream users. For example, with independence Uzbekistan 
discovered that it did not control the sources of the three main rivers – the Syr Darya, Amu 
Darya, and Zarafshon – on which it depended for its irrigated crop production. Although its 
interests are totally geared toward cotton cultivation, ninety-one percent of its water sources 
originate outside its territorial borders (Smith 1995, 361). Similarly, ninety-eight percent of 
Turkmenistan’s water sources form outside its borders (Smith 1995, 361). Even a substantial 
amount of Kazakhstan’s average yearly water flow from rivers (43 percent) is generated outside 
its borders in China, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. Simply, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union altered who controls the water and for what purposes water would be directed. The 
downstream states that are the main water consumers for irrigated agriculture, therefore, found 
that they were in a weaker position physically vis-à-vis the upstream countries. Moreover, 
Moscow no longer possessed the legitimate authority to resolve conflicts over water use and 
allocation. 
 
With independence, as each country began to redefine its own economic priorities, it became 
evident that their respective goals conflicted regarding for what purposes water should be used. 
All the basin states except Kazakhstan intend to increase their amount of irrigated land to meet 
the mounting food requirements of their growing populations: Kyrgyzstan would like to expand 
its irrigated land total by over 400,000 hectares, Tajikistan by between 40,000-140,000 hectares, 
Turkmenistan by 600,000 hectares and Uzbekistan by between 420,000-600,000 hectares 
(Micklin 2002, 37). At present, the total irrigated area in the Soviet successor states in Central 
Asia is about 7.9 million hectares of which approximately 4.2 million hectares are within 
Uzbekistan, 1.7 million hectares in Turkmenistan, 719,000 million hectares in Tajikistan, 
422,000 million hectares within Kyrgyzstan’s territory within the Aral Sea basin, and 786,000 
million hectares within Kazakhstan’s territory within the Aral Sea basin (Dukhovny and Sokolov 
2003, 4). 
 
For upstream Tajikistan and downstream Turkmenistan, expansion of their irrigated land would 
most likely result in increasing withdrawals from the Amu Darya. Turkmenistan, in particular, is 
seeking to extend the Kara Kum canal in order to reclaim additional land to expand cotton 
production. In contrast, the downstream populations in Karakalpakstan were hoping to increase 
water allocations for the Aral Sea and surrounding populations. In the Syr Darya basin, 
Kyrgyzstan sought to find foreign investors to harness its hydroelectric potential. In particular, it   7
hoped to complete the Kambarata power plant on the Naryn River so that it could produce 
electricity primarily for export. As of October 2003, the Integration Committee of the Eurasian 
Economic Community (EEC), which includes Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and 
Tajikistan, agreed to finance Kyrgyzstan' s Kambarata-2 power station and Tajikistan' s Sangtuda-
1 power stations. If these projects go ahead, they would allow the Central Asian states to export 
electricity directly to Russia (17 October 2003 RFE/RL). In short, upstream water development 
in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for agriculture or hydroelectricity would most likely obstruct the 
downstream states’ interests in maintaining and even expanding their cotton production. 
Upstream development could also potentially hinder regional solutions for mitigating the Aral 
Sea crisis that mostly affects the downstream populations in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and 
Kazakhstan.  
 
In fact, potential conflicts over equity, human development and economic development are most 
pronounced when it comes to the future of the downstream populations. Most of the water that 
reaches the Aral Sea is of a much poorer quality since a substantial amount consists of polluted 
drainage water that has been returned to the river. The downstream populations in Qyzlorda 
province in Kazakhstan, Karakalpakstan, Uzbekistan, and Dashhowuz, Turkmenistan receive 
water contaminated with fertilizers and other chemicals from the agricultural runoff. The clash 
of interests and capabilities between upstream and midstream agricultural users and the 
downstream populations that are seeking clean potable water represents a situation in which the 
disincentives for cooperation are starkest.  The downstream users in Karakalpakstan possess 
limited, if any, bargaining leverage over the upstream users since they lack any resources needed 
by the upstream users.  Because Karakalpakstan is furthest downstream, they simply receive all 
the pollution.  
 
Aral Sea Basin Cooperation 
 
Cooperation over transboundary water resources is extremely arduous because the benefits from 
cooperation are highly asymmetrical and unevenly distributed (see e.g., Waterbury 1994). In 
fact, because of the asymmetries of capabilities and interests between the upstream and 
downstream states in Central Asia following the Soviet Union’s collapse, it was expected that 
acute conflict over water would ignite among the newly independent states in the immediate 
years after independence (for details, see Weinthal 2002). These premonitions were based upon 
the region’s turbulent history of small-scale violent conflicts over water and land resources that 
took place in the late 1980s. In particular, in 1989 Tajiks and Uzbeks quarreled over land and 
water rights in the Vakhsh Valley; deadly ethnic strife erupted between Uzbeks and Meskhetian 
Turks in the Fergana Valley; and Tajiks and Kyrgyz fought over land and water rights in the 
Isfara-Batken districts along the border of the two republics.  
 
Yet, acute conflict over Central Asia’s transboundary water resources was not the norm after 
independence; rather, the Central Asian states embarked upon a process of institution building at 
the interstate level (for details, see Weinthal 2002). They were able to negotiate new interstate 
agreements to assuage potential water conflicts that were created by the demarcation of new 
political borders. Because the Central Asian leaders wanted to make certain that the traditional 
planting season was uninterrupted, they initially signed on February 18, 1992 an agreement on 
“Cooperation in the Management, Utilization, and Protection of Water Resources of Interstate   8
Sources" wherein the water resources of the region were defined as “common” and “integral” 
(Article 1). This agreement allowed the states to continue to cooperate according to historical 
practices and quantities employed during the Soviet period (UNECE et al. 2003, 7). It also 
established the Interstate Water Management Coordinating Commission (later referred to as the 
Interstate Commission for Water Coordination or ICWC), which was authorized to determine 
water consumption limits (broken down by growing and non-growing periods) for each of the 
individual states and for region as a whole.
4 Tied to the ICWC were the two river basin 
organizations (BVO Syr Darya and BVO Amu Darya) that while originally created in 1986 were 
responsible for planning and implementing water allocations among the different users 
(Dukhovny and Sokolov 2003).  
 
Although many assumed that Central Asia would be ridden with water conflicts after 
independence, it was actually the first region among the Soviet successor states to sign an 
international multilateral agreement over water (See Appendix II). In short, past precedence 
guided the Central Asian states. Water cooperation in the Aral Sea basin was bolstered by a 
several subsequent agreements. In March 1993, the Central Asian states introduced a new 
institutional framework for water management -- “on joint activities for addressing the crisis of 
the Aral Sea and the zone around the sea and for improving the environment and ensuring the 
social and economic development of the Aral Sea region.” This agreement and the 
accompanying statutes created two apex organizations to the original ICWC: the Interstate 
Council for Addressing the Aral Sea Crisis (ICAS) and the International Fund for the Aral Sea 
(IFAS) (for details, see TACIS/WARMAP, 1996). Later in July 1994, the Central Asian leaders 
established the Interstate Commission for Socio-Economic Development and Scientific, 
Technical, and Ecological Cooperation (ICSDSTEC) or what was the precursor to the 
Sustainable Development Commission (SDC). ICAS and its executive committee became the 
main organization for developing and implementing policies and programs in the Aral Sea Basin 
while IFAS and its executive council was supposed to elicit financial resources from the member 
states.
5 Then in 1996 the Heads of State renewed their commitment to water cooperation and 
signed the Nukus Declaration to strengthen these new institutions for joint water management.  
 
Why did the Central Asian states follow a path of cooperation in which they agreed to build new 
institutions for regional cooperation immediately after independence rather than pursuing 
policies that would promote their own individual gains? The short answer is cooperation came 
about in the early 1990s because of the pivotal role of international organizations that provided 
the necessary incentives (i.e., financial and technical assistance) to persuade these newly 
emerging countries to coordinate their policies to prevent acute water sharing conflicts from 
transpiring (Weinthal 2002). In fact, the Aral Sea basin is only one of a few prominent instances 
in which international organizations have succeeded to foster cooperation and prevent acute 
conflict over water resources (Weinthal 2002).
6 Because the donor community linked financial 
and material assistance to the creation of new interstate institutions for water management, the 
                                                  
4 The vegetation or growing season usually refers to the period between April-September in which most crops are 
grown, excluding winter wheat. 
5In 1997, the Central Asian leaders dissolved ICAS and transferred its responsibilities to IFAS in response to donor 
concerns about duplication of functions. 
6 Another notable case is the Indus Water Treaty in which the World Bank helped bring about an agreement between 
India and Pakistan.   9
Central Asian states were willing to engage in a process of building multilateral institutions over 
time rather than pursuing their individual policies. Although these new interstate institutions 
were fully unable to prevent future forms of discord from arising, this early cooperation is 
noteworthy since it reflects “a stage in the development of the framework for joint decision 
making and management of transboundary water resources” (Vinogradov and Langford 2001, 
351).  
 
The Aral Sea crisis initially attracted a larger share of international interest in transboundary 
water cooperation than many other transboundary water resources in the former Soviet Union 
because it offered the international community an extraordinary opportunity to link economic 
and political reforms with environment and conflict issues. In fact, since independence there 
have been approximately 15 to 20 donor organizations at any one time involved in projects 
related to the Aral Sea (LeMoigne 2003). Large multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, 
the European Union (TACIS), the United Nations (UNDP, UNEP, and UNESCO), North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) immediately 
established programs in the Aral basin after independence. The United States (USAID), 
Germany (GZT), Israel, the Netherlands, Japan (PHRD), and Switzerland provided direct 
bilateral assistance. Similarly, a large number of NGOs that include NOVIB (a Dutch 
organization), the Aral Sea International Committee (USA), ISAR (USA), Doctors without 
Borders (Medecins Sans Frontieres) and Mercy Corps International had programs in the Aral 
Sea region. While many of these organizations were interested in providing humanitarian 
assistance, they were also interested in using the environment as a means to enhance the 
likelihood that democracies and markets would flourish in Central Asia.  
 
The Central Asian states were willing to accept international assistance from the aforementioned 
organizations because they could no longer rely upon Moscow to help them address the Aral Sea 
crisis. Moreover, they greatly needed financial and technical assistance to help them build new 
state institutions and to join the international community of nation-states (Weinthal 2002). 
 
Owing to the combined desire of international organizations to intervene and the Central Asian 
states’ need for international assistance, international organizations were able to have a 
pronounced role in facilitating cooperation since they could employ side-payments in the form 
of financial and technical assistance to foster institution building (Weinthal 2002). The promise 
of financial and technical assistance right after independence encouraged the Central Asian 
states to create new interstate agreements in 1993 for the Aral Sea Basin rather than just 
continuing with past precedence under the 1992 agreement. In particular, the World Bank’s 
operating procedures that require states to commit formally to regional cooperation (e.g., an 
international water basin institution) before it will render aid also served as a critical 
inducement. Because Moscow could no longer resolve the Central Asian water sharing 
problems, the Central Asian countries recognized that mutually agreed upon cooperation would 
bring much needed donor assistance. Thus, following the establishment of the new apex 
organizations for managing the Aral Sea basin in 1993, the World Bank and other donors agreed 
to develop with the Central Asian states an aid package for the Aral Sea, which culminated in the 
Aral Sea Basin Program (ASBP). This program was intended 1) to stabilize the environment of 
the Aral Sea Basin; 2) to rehabilitate the disaster zone around the sea; 3) to improve the 
management of the international waters of the Aral Sea basin and 4) to build the capacity of the   10
newly created regional institutions (World Bank, UNDP, UNEP 1994). Implementation of the 
first phase of the ASBP was estimated to cost $470 million (World Bank 1995). In the end, the 
ASBP was able to mobilize approximately $280 million in loans and $50 million of grant-funded 
technical assistance for the Central Asian countries in the former Soviet Union (ADB 2003a).  
 
Following the ASBP, the European Union’s Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (EU-TACIS) initiated its Water Resources Management and Agricultural 
Production (WARMAP) project in 1994 to support ICAS. Its main objective was to draft new 
interstate agreements and national legislation that would be harmonized across the Central Asian 
states. The UNDP also launched an Aral Sea Basin Capacity Development Project to strengthen 
the capacity of the SDC and the ICAS. Subsequently, the World Bank and other international 
donors established the Global Environment Facility’s project (1998-2003) to enhance the Central 
Asian environment and management of the international rivers in the Aral Sea Basin. Most 
recently, the Central Asian countries under the leadership of IFAS prepared the Program on 
Concrete Actions on Improvement of Environmental and Socio-economic Situation in the Aral 
Sea Basin for the period from 2003 to 2010 (also known as the Second Aral Sea Basin Program) 
that is estimated to cost $2.5 billion (ADB 2003a). 
 
Cooperation in the form of new interstate institutions was achieved because side-payments (i.e., 
financial and technical assistance) were employed as a form of compensation to different 
domestic constituencies that could undermine the water sharing agreements and/or threaten the 
government’s hold on political and social stability (Weinthal 2002). Side-payments helped 
mitigate the harsh effects of the transition because with the disappearance of the center in 
Moscow, the Central Asian leadership found it difficult to provide socio-economic goods like 
environmental and social protection and patronage to republican and regional elites. Thus, the 
influx of donor assistance, albeit limited, helped the Central Asian leadership appease vital 
domestic constituencies that were hit hardest by the sweeping economic and political 
transformations that ensued during the first few years after independence. For example, much of 
the Aral Sea donor programs directed assistance toward the water and agricultural ministries. 
 
Specifically, the donor community crafted programs that would provide assistance not only to 
the different government ministries involved in the water and agricultural sectors, but also to the 
populations hardest hit by the Aral Sea crisis to assure compliance with the agreement. 
International organizations and non-governmental organizations, therefore, targeted a broad 
array of domestic interests in both the upstream and downstream states that could want to alter 
the water sharing arrangements (for details, see Weinthal 2002). For example, the donors 
introduced specific programs upstream for dam safety and downstream near the Aral for the 
provision of potable water and wetlands restoration.   
 
Yet, because the Central Asian leaders quickly devised these new water institutions to garner aid 
and appease the donors, this early phase of cooperation was more about political cooperation 
than sustainable environmental protection (Weinthal 2002). In fact, several donor evaluations of 
their programs have found many of their efforts to have produced unsatisfactory results and to 
have progressed slower than anticipated (World Bank 1997, World Bank 2004b). IFAS, in 
particular, was unable to fulfill its primary objective to act as a fund for Aral Sea programs early 
on given that it failed to collect the money promised to it by the Central Asian states. Despite the   11
one early success whereby the Central Asian states concluded a collective water resources 
management strategy -- “Fundamental Provisions of Water Management Strategy in the Aral Sea 
Basin” – a subsequent program such as the Water and Environmental Management Project failed 
to bolster the ASBP’s efforts to stabilize the environment and improve the management of 
international waters (World Bank 2004b). As time progressed, it became evident to the donors 
that the Central Asian countries were also unwilling to defer formal decision-making authority to 
the executive council of IFAS (EC-IFAS). When the EC-IFAS moved to Turkmenistan (1999-
2002), its Project Management and Coordination Unit (PMCU) remained in Tashkent, resulting 
in IFAS’s weakened institutional capacity to carry out regional programs despite having received 
about $32 million in donor assistance in the form of technical assistance for studies as part of the 
first phase of the ASBP (World Bank 2004b, 12). In 2002, EC-IFAS moved to Tajikistan and 
has made efforts to rebuild its institutional capacity.   
 
Although international intervention successfully precluded violent conflict from transpiring, 
cooperation, nonetheless, began to falter in the mid-1990s owing to the Central Asian countries’ 
inability to agree on a comprehensive regional approach. Rather, the emerging consensus among 
both the donors and Central Asian countries was that donor efforts should focus on each basin 
separately (Amu Darya versus Syr Darya), especially given that the Sea had essentially divided 
into two halves.  
 
Moreover, the 1992 agreement failed to adapt water allocations to the new political reality of 
divergent physical capabilities and economic interests and hence to take into account upstream 
demands for increased water allocations. Because the donors focused on propping up ICAS and 
IFAS, the 1992 agreement continued to determine water quotas, which bolstered the downstream 
riparians’ interests in maintaining an irrigation regime. Thus, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan 
continued to receive the largest allotments of water; in 1996-1997 Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan 
received 38 percent and 26 percent, respectively of water withdrawals from the basin whereas 
Kyrgyzstan received the smallest allocation – that is, less than 1 percent of the Syr Darya and 0.2 
percent of the Amu Darya (Micklin 2000, 44-45). Simply, the upstream states were less inclined 
to abide by water allocations that perpetuated a regional economic system based upon cotton 
monoculture. Thus, early cooperation began to fracture when it became evident that the Central 
Asian states needed to address energy, Afghanistan, cotton, and other potential water conflicts. 
These topics are discussed below in greater detail. 
 
Energy 
 
These early water sharing agreements were not sustainable over the long-term owing to the 
disparity in fossil-fuel resources between the upstream and downstream states. Most important, 
they did not take into account energy issues and the interdependencies that existed during the 
Soviet period in which water and energy were exchanged freely between the water-rich upstream 
states and the fossil fuel-rich downstream states (Weinthal 2002). Mounting pressures for the 
development of hydroelectricity upstream in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan began to trigger new 
conflicts between upstream and downstream states. 
 
Syr Darya 
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The first and most prominent conflict between water and energy to emerge was the management 
regime for water releases from the Toktogul reservoir that is located on the Naryn River – a 
tributary of the Syr Darya in Kyrgyzstan.  As the largest reservoir on the Naryn River and the 
only one with substantial storage capacity, Toktogul determines how much water is released to 
the lower reservoirs along the cascade and ultimately how much water reaches the fields and the 
Aral Sea. After independence, Kyrgyzstan began to consider alternative uses for its upstream 
infrastructure – that is, the generation of hydroelectricity rather than storage for releases during 
the spring and summer to support agriculture downstream. Soviet planners, however, originally 
constructed the Toktogul reservoir to meet irrigation demands downstream (i.e., in Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan) rather than to generate energy for Kyrgyzstan’s consumption.  
 
Initially, the Central Asian states upheld many of these interdependencies in which Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan negotiated annual barter agreements for fuel and water resources. 
According to these barter arrangements that were negotiated either bilaterally or trilaterally, 
Kyrgyzstan supplied both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan with water during the summer months in 
return for gas and coal, respectively, during the winter months.
7 Kyrgyzstan also sold its excess 
power generated from running the hydroelectric stations in the summer months to Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan as part of these barter arrangements. These barter arrangements were a relic of 
Protocol No. 413 (7 February 1984) from the Soviet period in which the upstream reservoirs 
were designated to support an irrigation regime downstream (World Bank 2004a, 8). According 
to this protocol, Uzbekistan receives 46 percent of the total surface flow of 22.7 billion cubic 
meters in the river; Kazakhstan receives 44 percent; Tajikistan receives 8 percent and 
Kyrgyzstan 2 percent (World Bank 2004a, 8). Although the 1992 agreement sought to maintain 
an irrigation regime so that the cotton harvests would not be disrupted, the Soviet Union’s 
collapse, nevertheless, shattered these physical and economic interdependencies and could not 
prevent competing claims from surfacing.  
 
Conflicts over Toktogul emerged in the mid-1990s when the energy-rich states, Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan, began to formulate their energy development strategies, independently of the needs 
of each other and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan wanted to be self-sufficient in oil and gas production 
given that it had to use its cotton revenue to pay Russia for oil at world prices. The Uzbekistan 
government, as a result, sought to increase energy production for domestic consumption and to 
demand world market prices for its exports to Kyrgyzstan. Because Kazakhstan did not possess 
any alternative export revenue and faced high levels of political competition at independence, it 
chose to privatize its energy sector (i.e., oil, gas, and coal) to foreign investors (Jones Luong and 
Weinthal 2001). It then also began to demand hard currency for its exports from the other 
Central Asian countries and in particular, Kyrgyzstan. 
 
Thus, without the hard currency to purchase energy and lacking its own indigenous fuel supplies, 
energy shortages ensued during the winter months in Kyrgyzstan. In response, Kyrgyzstan 
periodically began to operate the Toktogul power plant for electricity generation in the winter 
                                                  
7 For example, see “Protocol of the Meeting of Representatives of Fuel-Energy and Water Management Complexes 
of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan on Problem of the Toktogul Cascade Water-Energy Resources Use in 
1996,” ICWC Bulletin 11 (November 1996) and “Agreement Between the Governments of the Kyrgyz Republic and 
the Republic of Uzbekistan on the Question of the Use of Hydro-electric Resources of the Naryn-Syr Darya Hydro-
Electric Power Station,” 1996.   13
months rather than to adhere to an irrigation regime. Kyrgyzstan, moreover, faced a collective 
action dilemma because even if Kyrgyzstan abided by the irrigation scheme for Toktogul and 
delivered water to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, it had no guarantee that it would receive gas and 
coal in return as under the former Soviet barter arrangements. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan could 
easily cheat since the above-mentioned agreements primarily dealt with water and not energy 
allocations. In fact, from 1990-2000, summer releases from the upstream reservoirs on the Naryn 
declined to 45 percent of their annual discharges where winter releases increased to 55 percent 
(World Bank 2004a, iv). This sharply contrasts with the Soviet period wherein annual releases 
were 75 percent in the summer and only 25 percent in the winter (World Bank 2004a, 2). The 
1992 agreement also lacked effective dispute resolution mechanisms. It only stipulated that 
water disputes were to be resolved by the Ministers of Water; no provisions were made if they 
could not resolve such disputes (Vinogradov and Langford 2001).   
   
The operation of Toktogul in the winter months also placed new stresses on the downstream 
states’ economy and ecological predicament because upstream water consumption in the winter 
months diminishes the amount of irrigation water available for the downstream users during the 
summer months. Since independence, Uzbekistan has sought to ensure ample water deliveries to 
maintain its agricultural sector, which accounted for approximately half of its GDP in the 
immediate years after independence (ADB 1997). Moreover, the downstream users in 
Kazakhstan (i.e., Qyzlorda) feared that operating Toktogul in the winter months could have 
further deleterious effects on the Aral Sea, as less water would be available to sustain what 
became the smaller sea. To aggravate the situation further, water released from Toktogul in the 
winter months does not reach the Aral Sea, but is diverted to a local depression, the Arnasai 
lowland, because of the winter freezing of the lower Syr Darya and adjoining canals, which 
block the large volume of water from reaching the sea (Solodennikof 1996, World Bank 2004a, 
iii). These water diversions, instead, have formed the Aydarkul Lake and have damaged land and 
infrastructure in the Syr Darya delta (World Bank 2004a, 6). If it is a dry year, Kyrgyzstan can 
reduce the water flow to Uzbekistan in the spring and summer when the demand for irrigation is 
at its highest peak downstream. Thus, in drought years, like the few years from 1999 to 2002, the 
Aral Sea and the surrounding regions is sacrificed to the upstream demands for irrigation (Glantz 
2002).  
 
Overall, state elites in Kyrgyzstan feel that they should receive payments from Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan for water deliveries from the rivers originating within their territorial borders. In 
1997 the President of Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akaev, signed an edict that declared Kyrgyzstan’s 
“right to profit” from its water resources, which includes selling water to its neighbors (Hogan 
2000). More so, they want the downstream riparians to contribute to the maintenance of the 
Toktogul reservoir, especially since the downstream riparians are still the main beneficiaries. As 
a result, in 1997 a few members of the Kyrgyzstan Parliament (Jogorku Kenesh) sent a letter to 
the head of the World Bank’s mission in Kyrgyzstan that expressed their concern that the status 
quo 1992 water agreement, which they felt unfairly, reflected only the downstream interests.
8 
 
By breaking down the former interdependencies of the Soviet system and treating the Aral Sea 
crisis as merely a water problem after independence, the international community and the 
                                                  
8 Letter from Kyrgyzstan Parliament to Michael Rathnam, World Bank, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 28.06.97, No. 01-
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Central Asian governments failed to use to their advantage the Soviet legacy of interdependence 
to foster more sustainable cooperation. Only in the mid-1990s did the international community 
begin to realize that mutual gains could be reached from trading energy for water. The first to 
recognize the potential of linking water with energy was USAID that began in 1996 to focus on 
a limited water sharing agreement over the Syr Darya River (for details, see Weinthal 2002). 
Thus, rather than to work with the entrenched water nomenklatura (i.e., state elites) from the 
downstream states, USAID began to promote another regional institution in which Kyrgyzstan 
was a prominent player -- the Interstate Council for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan 
(ICKKU) -- and formed a working group called the Water and Energy Uses Roundtable 
composed of one water official and one energy official from each Syr Darya riparian state. 
USAID was hoping to break the impasse between the Syr Darya states, who each year were 
having to renegotiate the above mentioned barter exchanges between water for energy. 
Specifically, USAID aimed to redefine the scope and form of environmental cooperation in the 
Aral Sea basin by dealing only with the potential and real disputes over water management 
schemes for the Toktogul reservoir.  
 
USAID relied upon a strategy of issue-linkage to balance the asymmetry of interests and 
capabilities among the Central Asian countries. Issue-linkage is a negotiating technique that 
creates different options for building institutions for cooperation by increasing the opportunities 
for trade-offs and for generating mutual benefits to trade (for details, see Susskind 1994, 
Sebenius 1983). As a result, USAID worked to encourage the Central Asian participants to 
broaden the number of actors and issues on the agenda, which had the added benefit of bringing 
additional parties to the bargaining table that if excluded, could undermine cooperation. Through 
a series of roundtables it convened between 1996 and 1997, USAID was able to give the energy 
sector in Kyrgyzstan a prominent role in the negotiations whereas in earlier efforts to address the 
Aral Sea basin, it was marginalized.  
 
USAID’s efforts resulted in an interstate water compact between the Syr Darya riparians in 1998 
that was to cover a 5-year period. Central to this agreement was the concept of compensation for 
energy losses from the upstream storage of water during the winter months (World Bank 2004a, 
9). This agreement recognized that Kyrgyzstan wanted to exploit the upper watershed for 
hydroelectricity and took into account Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan’s desire to receive the same 
quantity and quality of water they historically received for irrigation and agricultural purposes. 
Tajikistan subsequently joined the ICKKU, which then became the ICKKTU. In contrast to 
earlier donor programs that focused solely on water in the Aral Sea basin, USAID succeeded 
because it added the energy sector to the bargaining agenda while simultaneously subtracting the 
Amu Darya basin from the negotiations. By breaking down the Aral Sea Basin into two separate 
river basins, USAID was able to remove the most difficult riparian, Turkmenistan, from the 
bargaining forum. Turkmenistan, of all the riparians, was and remains the most resistant to 
outside intervention in the Aral Sea basin.   
 
Although this water agreement was an improvement to the 1992 agreement, it has yet to 
mitigate water conflicts fully in the region. Because this1998 agreement was not 
exhaustive, the Syr Darya riparians have had to continue to negotiate annually the exact 
terms of the barter arrangements, including the actual volumes of water releases and 
amount of compensation (World Bank 2004a, 10). The result is that Uzbekistan has still   15
periodically ceased its gas deliveries to Kyrgyzstan (RFE/RL 29 November 1999, 
RFE/RL 22 October 2001).  Moreover, in 2003 and 2004, the Syr Darya riparians were 
unable to conclude annual agreements (Abbink et al. 2005, 4).  
 
The breakdown in cooperation is most evident by Uzbekistan’s unilateral steps to offset 
Kyrgyzstan’s use of water in the winter months (Abbink et al. 2005, 4). In trying to 
achieve sufficient water supplies during the summer months for its agricultural 
production, Uzbekistan has sought to increase it storage capacity downstream in the 
Fergana Valley near UchKurgan. It has built two reservoirs with a total of 1 km
3 of active 
storage (personal communication with Professor Daene C. McKinney, University of 
Texas at Austin, 23 January 2006). Yet, a recent study has found that while Uzbekistan’s 
unilateral measures might help diminish its dependence upon Kyrgyzstan, it does not 
maximize basin wide efficiency (Abbink et al. 2005, 1). In addition, Abbink et al. (2005, 
17) found that for the Syr Darya countries to benefit from cooperation, Uzbekistan needs 
to compensate Kyrgyzstan for its summer releases of water. Kazakhstan has, 
nevertheless, followed suit and has begun to consider taking a similar action to decrease 
its dependence upon Kyrgyzstan’s and Uzbekistan’s control of the water flow through 
self-financing the Koksarai Reservoir downstream of the Chardara Dam (Abbink et al. 
2005, 5, World Bank 2004a, 9). 
 
Because of their individual pursuit of self-sufficiency in water and energy, the Syr Darya 
riparian countries have become invested in pursuing extremely costly solutions instead of 
adhering to the mutual interdependence of the water system. Moreover, trading energy 
for water is not sufficient, but rather a need still remains to address energy even more 
broadly. Another complementary option to strengthen cooperation in the Syr Darya basin 
so that downstream countries have enough water during the summer and the upstream 
countries have enough energy resources during the long winter months is to improve 
Kyrgyzstan’s energy efficiency.  In particular, technical improvements might mitigate 
electricity losses in Kyrgyzstan that currently deprive it of about 40 percent of its energy 
production (Blua 2003).  
 
Amu Darya  
 
At the same time that the Central Asian states have made limited progress on allocating the 
waters of the Syr Darya, the exclusion of the Amu Darya from the negotiations has left 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Afghanistan without a real institutional 
mechanism for managing the Amu Darya. Because Iran’s usage is almost negligible, it is not a 
major player in the Amu Darya basin. Initially, many of the upstream-downstream disparities in 
the Amu Darya basin were not as apparent after independence like in the Syr Darya basin 
because Tajikistan, which contributes approximately 80 percent of the flow into the Amu Darya 
(Zonn 2002, 8), found itself engulfed in a 5-year civil war (1992-97). Rather, it was only after 
the cessation of hostilities that Tajikistan’s new upstream position began to impinge upon its 
interstate relations with its downstream neighbors. That Tajikistan may increase its water 
withdrawals has precipitated fears among the downstream riparians that their water allocations 
may be reduced. At present, Tajikistan is allotted 9 billion cubic meters annually, which is based 
upon past Soviet allocations from 1987 and then reaffirmed with the 1992 Agreement (Ahmad   16
and Wasiq 2004, 26). The need for new water institutions in the Amu Darya, therefore, may be 
even more pressing given that both Tajikistan and Afghanistan would like to harness their 
upstream waters to accelerate their economic recovery following years of civil strife and 
economic upheaval.  
 
Even before the civil war, Tajikistan was one of the poorest of the republics in the former Soviet 
Union. Close to 70 percent of its six million people live in rural areas with 50 percent employed 
in the agricultural sector (McKinney 2004, 202).  Only seven percent of its territory is suitable 
for agricultural production of which most is devoted to cotton (ICG 2003, 3). Similar to 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, cotton cultivation is its major cash crop. Cotton is grown in the 
irrigated valleys of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers and accounts for approximately two-
thirds of the gross production value of the agricultural sector (McKinney 2004). The end result is 
that Tajikistan only grows 40 percent of its cereal needs (ICG 2003, 3).  
 
Although there is a limited amount of additional land that could be cultivated upstream, if 
Tajikistan were, indeed, to go ahead and develop this land, it would most likely do so by 
increasing its withdrawals from the Amu Darya or to divert the Zarafshon River (Ahmad and 
Wasiq 2004, 26). The latter, in particular, could strain relations with Uzbekistan that already 
withdraws 95 percent of the Zarafshon’s flow (Ahmad and Wasiq 2004, 26). 
 
Among the Soviet successor states, energy resources are also unevenly distributed between the 
upstream and downstream riparians in the Amu Darya basin. While the downstream countries 
(i.e., Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) are rich in oil and gas resources, Tajikistan is only rich in 
water resources and hence potential hydropower. Overall, Tajikistan is the world’s third largest 
producer of hydropower and 90 percent of the energy generating capacity of the country is 
hydroelectric (Carius et.al. 2003, 18). Yet, during the Soviet period, hydroelectricity supported 
the aluminum industry, which provided Tajikistan with a major source of earnings (Carius et.al. 
2003, 18). Instead, Tajikistan received fuel from its downstream neighbors for its heating 
purposes. 
 
Thus, in the post-Soviet period, Tajikistan like Kyrgyzstan is facing a shortage of fuel supplies 
and could potentially seek to exploit its upstream water resources for electricity. At present, 
Tajikistan’s most important hydroelectric station – Nurek -- is located on the Vakhsh River, a 
tributary of the Amu Darya and provides seasonal rather than multiyear storage for managing 
water releases for irrigation purposes. One option that has been under consideration for years to 
augment Tajikistan’s hydropower capacity is to complete the Rogun dam, which would 
undoubtedly have a negative impact on the downstream riparians’ access to water supplies 
during the irrigation season (ICG 2002). Similar to the challenges raised in finding an equitable 
solution to the water sharing dilemma in the Syr Darya basin, additional hydropower generation 
in the winter months to meet Tajikistan’s energy needs would shift the operation of its 
installations to an energy regime and thus reduce the water availability for irrigation in the 
downstream states during the summer months. Thus, in order to preclude similar conflicts from 
arising as in the Syr Darya basin, Tajikistan will need to reach an agreement with Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan that also takes into account energy and water issues.  
 
Cooperation along the Amu Darya, however, is even more complicated than in the Syr Darya not   17
only because of the potential disputes between the upstream riparian (i.e., Tajikistan) and the 
downstream riparians (i.e., Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan), but also because of the festering 
conflicts between the two downstream countries – Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. At present, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan divide the Amu Darya water equally in which each receives about 
40 percent of the flow (Abdullaev 2001), but this allocation could become an international point 
of contention, as Turkmenistan would like to increase the amount of water it diverts to the Kara 
Kum canal so that it can bring new land under cultivation. At present, it diverts on average 11.5 
billion cubic meters per year (McKinney 2004, 208-209).  
 
Turkmenistan also has plans to create a huge artificial lake in the midst of the Kara Kum Desert 
that has been called both Golden Century Lake and Lake Turkmen (ICG 2005, 30 and 
EurasiaNet 2004). Construction of the 1,000 square mile lake (approximately 2,000 square 
kilometers) began in 2002 and is only expected to be completed in 20 years (RFE/RL 7 May 
2003). The project is estimated to cost anywhere from $4.5 - $9 billion. Although it is supposed 
to use irrigation runoff, it will also most likely require increasing withdrawals from the Amu 
Darya. This project has generated far-reaching criticism from abroad because of the 
government’s plan to relocate large numbers of its ethnic minorities (primarily Uzbeks) to the 
surrounding desert (RFE/RL 17 December 2003). Uzbekistan has also voiced its opposition to 
the above-mentioned projects owing to their negative impact upon the Uzbek minority in 
Turkmenistan and their potential effects on the downstream flow of the Amu Darya. These 
projects are clearly a relic of the Soviet Union in which resources were directed toward building 
large-scale, grandiose projects rather than increasing investment to improve its aging water 
infrastructure such as lining the Kara Kum canal (EurasiaNet 2004, RFE/RL 7 May 2003).  
 
In short, the absence of an agreement among the Amu Darya riparians in the former Soviet 
Union compounded by an increase in upstream diversions will aggravate the deteriorating 
ecological and economic situation in the downstream states and in the near Aral region. In fact, 
in response to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan’s massive diversions of the Amu Darya for cotton 
cultivation, Kazakhstan has chosen to take unilateral measures to address the Aral Sea crisis in 
the Syr Darya basin. Specifically, it has overlooked the Amu Darya as a potential source of 
water for the Aral and has focused its restoration efforts solely on the Syr Darya. As a result, it is 
constructing a seven-mile dam across the smaller part of the sea (Brown 2003) in order to benefit 
from what currently flows into the Aral from the Syr Darya. With assistance from the World 
Bank (i.e., Syr Darya Control and Northern Aral Sea Phase-I Project for Kazakhstan), it is 
hoping to restore the northern part of the sea and ultimately to revive its fishing industry 
(http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20012934~menuPK:3
4466~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html, Brown 2003). 
 
Afghanistan 
 
One of the biggest challenges for fostering cooperation within the Amu Darya basin is the 
inclusion of Afghanistan, as it contributes 8 percent of the flow to the Amu Darya (McKinney 
2004, 201, Zonn 2002, 8). Although the Amu Darya basin only covers 12 percent of the Afghan 
territory, it supports about 25 percent of the Afghan population (Ahmad and Wasiq 2004, 1). The 
total area of irrigated land in Northern Afghanistan is approximately 1.2 million hectares of   18
which 385,000 hectares is on and along rivers with permanent flow to the Amu Darya (Ahmad 
and Wasiq 2004, 3, 25). 
 
Although independence introduced new fault lines among the Central Asian states, a long history 
of cooperation between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan over the Amu Darya and its tributaries 
preceded the Soviet Union’s dissolution. The Soviet Union and Afghanistan signed several 
regional agreements in 1921, 1946 and 1958 to resolve rights of navigation, water quality, and 
the delineation of their shared border along the Amu Darya (Ahmad and Wasiq 2004, 4, 
Caponera 1995).
9 The 1958 agreement precluded construction on the Panj and the Amu Darya 
without mutual agreement among the parties (Ahmad and Wasiq 2004, 4). These agreements 
also established an international commission to contend with the use and quality of the frontier 
water resources (Caponera 1995).  
 
Yet, after the Soviet Union’s collapse, the Soviet successor states in Central Asia were quite 
adamant that Afghanistan should not be included in the new institutions for water management 
so as not to interrupt past practices that favored cotton cultivation downstream. The absence of a 
clear political authority in Afghanistan in the early 1990s, moreover, precluded Afghanistan’s 
participation in the early negotiations over water sharing in the Aral Sea basin. Yet, with the 
newly elected government in place (i.e., the Karzai government), opportunities for cooperation 
seem possible. International law, moreover, requires that any water sharing agreement over the 
Amu Darya must take into account Afghanistan’s interests, as it is an upstream riparian 
(Vinogradov and Langford 2001). More so, some have suggested that the aforementioned 
agreements between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan are still applicable and will need to be 
reconciled with any new institutions for water management (Vinogradov and Langford 2001, 
Ahmad and Wasiq 2004, 4).  
 
The economic reconstruction of Afghanistan depends upon regional cooperation over the Amu 
Darya. In particular, the revival of the agricultural sector in northern Afghanistan is critical for 
its success since this area is already considered to be the most productive agricultural region in 
Afghanistan (Ahmad and Wasiq 2004, 1). At present, agriculture comprises 50 percent of 
Afghanistan’s GDP and employs 85 percent of the labor force (Ahmad and Wasiq 2004, 2) of 
which women make up a significant proportion (ADB 2003b, 3). Prior to the Soviet invasion, 
Afghanistan was self-sufficient in cereals and was an exporter of dried fruits and nuts (ADB 
2003b, 2). The civil war, however, damaged large tracts of agricultural land and destroyed much 
of Afghanistan’s irrigation infrastructure, which has decreased the amount of land under 
cultivation, especially for wheat and barley (Zonn 2002, Ahmad and Wasiq 2004, 8). Moreover, 
recent years of drought has further contributed to erosion of the river banks and levees, making 
the fields more susceptible to flooding during periods of heavy rainfall (Gerstle 2004). 
 
Overall, water use in Northern Afghanistan from tributaries with permanent flow into the 
Amu Darya is currently estimated to be at most about 5 billion cubic meters whereas in 
the 1960s it hovered around 2.5 billion cubic meters (Ahmad and Wasiq 2004, 3).
10 Yet, 
                                                  
9 Frontier Agreement between Afghanistan and the USSR, 13 June 1946 and Treaty concerning the regime to the 
Soviet-Afghan frontier, 18 January 1958. 
10 Ahmad and Wasiq (2004, 3) point out that most current data regarding water flows in Afghanistan is based upon 
estimates from data collected in the 1960s and 1970s.   19
the effects of two decades of civil strife on the irrigation systems has probably made total 
use much lower (Ahmad and Wasiq 2004, 23); some estimate it could be as low as 2 
billion cubic meters annually (McKinney 2004, 202). It is expected that Afghanistan will 
seek to increase its water withdrawals to rebuild its decimated agricultural sector and to 
develop its hydropower capacity (Zonn 2002, ICG 2002). Yet, any increased withdrawals 
will have a substantial impact downstream (Zonn 2002). In particular, increased water 
diversions and steps to reconstruct ailing irrigation systems might exacerbate economic 
hardship, environmental destruction and fuel interstate conflict over water. The 
downstream users in the Aral Sea region will experience the dwindling flow of water, 
especially during dry years unless the Soviet successor states can both come to an 
agreement with Afghanistan that will accommodate increased withdrawals upstream and 
improve water management policies downstream in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Yet, 
one study has suggested that reducing applications at the field level in Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan could compensate for increased upstream withdrawals (Ahmad and Wasiq 
2004, 4). 
 
Although donors such as USAID are funding projects such as the International Center for 
Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas to work on water issues in Afghanistan, the 
inclusion of Afghanistan in projects for regional cooperation has yet to become a central 
focus of their development assistance (Gerstle 2004). Rather, USAID, for example, has 
concentrated on specific infrastructure improvement projects within Afghanistan such as 
canal renovations and dam reinforcements (Gerstle 2004). 
 
Cotton 
 
Agriculture is an extremely important part of Central Asia’s political economy and accordingly a 
critical component for fostering sustainable cooperation over water in the region. It is the largest 
consumer of water, accounting for more than 90 percent of total water use of which the 
downstream countries use about 85 percent of the waters from the Aral Sea basin (McKinney 
2004, 190). Agriculture accounts for approximately 30 percent of the region’s GDP (Guadagni 
et.al. 2005, 1). In Uzbekistan, it makes-up 60 percent of foreign exchange receipts and provides 
45 percent of employment (World Bank 2004a, 3).  
 
Within the Aral Sea basin, cotton is the region’s most strategic crop. By 1990 cotton covered 85 
percent of irrigated land (Glantz 2002, 4). In Uzbekistan, which is the region’s largest producer 
of cotton, it generates approximately 25 percent of its foreign exchange revenues and a large 
share of tax revenues (Guadagni et.al. 2005, 1). The cotton sector also provides an important 
source of employment. At the peak of cotton production during the Soviet period, the cotton 
sector employed 40 percent of the labor force (Rumer 1989, 62). Even after the Soviet Union’s 
dissolution, cotton still reigns as the leading agricultural export. 
 
In addition to large quantities of water, the cultivation of cotton depends upon the extensive use 
of fertilizers and pesticides. The Central Asian countries have been able to maintain cotton 
monoculture as the backbone of their economies despite declining yields that have fallen by 
about 20 percent since the early 1990s (World Bank 2003, 3) because water is basically free. 
Historically, water has not been used efficiently since its use is not metered and fields are often   20
just flooded. One recent study found that farmers in Uzbekistan withdraw on average 14,000 m
3 
of water per hectare for irrigation in comparison to 9,000-10,000 m
3 per hectare in Pakistan and 
Egypt -- two countries that are not known either for their efficient use of water (Bucknall et al. 
2003, 3). Moreover, the cultivation of cotton has relied upon cheap labor in which students, 
women, children, industrial workers, soldiers, clerks, and drivers are forced to pick cotton during 
the harvesting season for “a symbolic wage” (Synovitz 1997).  
 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have only decreased the amount of land where cotton is grown 
when it has been absolutely necessary – that is, for the most part because of increasing 
salinization of the soil or to make room for food production in some of the more densely 
populated areas (Craumer 1995, 16). The Uzbekistan government’s decision to promote wheat 
self-sufficiency is largely responsible for the recent decline in cotton production (Guadagni et.al. 
2005). More so, because winter wheat is less water intensive than cotton, a substantial drop in 
irrigation withdrawals per hectare was recorded during the early 1990s (Micklin 2000, 41). From 
1990-1994, the total area in which grain was cultivated increased from 12 percent to 26 percent 
at the same time that cotton decreased  from 40 percent to 32 percent (Micklin 2000, 41).  Yet, 
this shift away from cotton was not intended to improve water efficiency, but rather to promote 
food security. In fact, cotton and wheat still account for 80 percent of cultivated land (World 
Bank 2003, 14-15).  
 
Because of the economic and strategic importance of cotton and wheat, Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan have only carried out minimal reform in the agricultural sector. Both retained the 
Soviet-era system of goszakaz after independence in which cotton and grain production targets 
are set by the state. By maintaining state controls, the governments can decide which land the 
farmers must devote to these crops. In both countries, state commodity boards control the 
requisition of cotton by setting artificially low prices at which the government purchases cotton 
and then resells it for world market prices to foreign countries. Although the amount of cotton 
that the farmers must sell to the state was dramatically liberalized in Uzbekistan in 2001 (ICG 
2005, 4), in practice farmers must still sell almost all of their harvest to the state because they 
lack direct access to the foreign buyers. Moreover, even with increasing liberalization in prices, 
farmers in Uzbekistan seldom receive the real price for their cotton since payments are dispensed 
through government banks, which are often reluctant to pay the farmers and when they do so, it 
is months late (ICG 2005, 4). Although farmers are still required to sell 50 percent of their wheat 
harvest to the state, farmers in Uzbekistan prefer to cultivate it instead of cotton because 
payment is usually immediate and farmers can grow non-strategic crops (e.g., vegetables) during 
the five months (July-November) in which the fields are fallow (Guadagni et.al. 2005).  
 
To date, the Uzbekistan government has initiated a program to break-up some state and 
collective farms and transfer some landholdings from the collective farms into private hands 
(Guadagni et.al. 2005, ICG 2005). Mostly, the government since 1993 has been replacing 
collective farms with new cooperatives called shirkhats, which now cultivate 69 percent of the 
land (World Bank 2003, 15). Yet, in practice, real production relations have remained largely 
unchanged since the Soviet period (Craumer 1995, 7). Most of the shirkhats are, in fact, the 
same kolkhozes (collective farms) but on a smaller level and are still responsible for meeting 
government production targets especially for cotton and grain (Ilkhamov 1998).
  Even private 
farmers are unable to decide what to grow. Because the government allots them their land, they   21
are beholden to the regional leadership (i.e., hakims in Uzbekistan) that has the authority to 
revoke their land entitlements (30 October 2003 RFE/RL). The result is that in some areas 
private farmers must plant up to 98 percent of their holdings with state-ordered cotton or wheat 
(ICG 2005, 3). Similar processes have been observed in Tajikistan. Even when state land has 
been given to dehqan (household farms) associations, the same structure and hierarchy has 
remained in place as in the Soviet period; farmers are also left with little choice, but to plant 
cotton, which in some cases amounts to 75 percent of their land (ICG 2003, 3-4).  
 
Despite the above-mentioned steps to reform the agricultural sector in Uzbekistan, the shirkhats 
continue to generate losses. Because the government has always granted them debt relief, they 
have had little incentive to become more efficient by reducing their inputs and managing their 
level of debt like individual private farmers (Guadagni et.al. 2005). As a result, the shirkhats still 
operate without any hard-budget constraints. In contrast, the dehqan farms in Uzbekistan, which 
are not subject to state directives, are more productive; yet, because they lack access to the more 
fertile land and sufficient inputs, they have had a limited role in transforming the agricultural 
sector (World Bank 2003, 15, ICG 2005, 3). 
 
Why have Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan resisted sweeping agricultural reforms if cotton is 
irrefutably the source of so many of the region’s social and ecological ills? The short answer is 
that the downstream countries have maintained cotton monoculture because it generates an 
important source of revenue and props up a system of social and political control that was 
inherited from the Soviet period (Weinthal 2002). To carry out sweeping agricultural reform, the 
Central Asian leadership would need to compensate or displace a large number of vested 
interests engaged in cotton production. The Central Asian states and the international community 
would also have to replace cotton with less water intensive crops besides just grains. Yet, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have shown that they are not willing to forfeit such a vital source 
of foreign earnings as from cotton. Indeed, the importance of cotton as a source of foreign 
revenue was immediately evident following the Soviet Union’s collapse. In 1991, cotton already 
comprised approximately 84 percent of Uzbekistan’s foreign exports, and by 1992, it provided 
over three-quarters of Uzbekistan’s total export revenue alone (World Bank 1993, 24, IMF 1992, 
2).  As of 2002 cotton still accounted for approximately 60 percent of Uzbekistan’s hard-
currency export earnings (Abbink et al. 2005, 2). Cotton over time has also become a significant 
source of taxation. In Uzbekistan, the World Bank estimates net transfers (taxes minus subsidies) 
to government coffers at around 20-22 percent of farmers’ gross cotton revenue in 2003-2004 
(Guadagni et.al. 2005, iv).  Simply, the cotton sector is “over-taxed” relative to other crops 
(Guadagni et.al. 2005, iv). As such, Uzbekistan remains the world’s third largest producer of 
cotton of which nearly all is exported (Micklin 2000). 
 
The governments of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have also resisted liberalization of the 
agricultural sector for several other reasons. First, shifting away from cotton could result in 
higher levels of unemployment in the countryside and exacerbate the likelihood of political and 
social instability in the rural areas (Weinthal 2002). Second, privatization of the farms would 
lead to a situation in which people would only devote themselves to smaller private plots and 
could potentially create a situation in which the state would be forced to loosen its control on the 
population. Third, this would break down the system of patronage ties with the local and 
regional authorities since the population would no longer be required to turn over a certain   22
percentage of their harvest to the state and could invest in alternative crops. Thus, despite the 
efforts of international and local NGOs at the end of the Soviet period to halt cotton monoculture 
in Central Asia, most international programs seeking to promote water cooperation have 
concurred with the government’s desire to resist dismantling cotton as a system of social and 
political control and instead have concentrated their efforts on either water or energy issues 
during the 1990s (for details, see Weinthal 2002, Weinthal 2001).  
 
Although the current system of state controls should create disincentives for farmers to produce 
cotton relative to alternative crops, they have also continued to cultivate cotton and, moreover, 
remain politically acquiescent owing to the system of social protection inherited from the Soviet 
period (Weinthal 2002). Even today, revenue generated from the sale of cotton has allowed 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to sustain an intricate patronage system (Weinthal 2002). In 
particular, the revenue from cotton sales has helped to provide the population with “cheap 
energy, low food prices, and a costly social protection system” (World Bank 2003, 3). Farmers 
are still able to accrue indirect benefits. For example, the government provides them with 
significant subsidies for irrigation, financing and other inputs (Guadagni et.al. 2005, 2). The 
obtainment of free inputs is an implicit side-payment from the state to the farmers that allows 
them to use water for other purposes. Owing to the subsidized farm inputs such as free water and 
cheap fertilizers and fuel, farmers have few incentives to conserve water. Thus, such subsidies 
have retarded attempts to introduce water pricing and to devolve decision-making authority to 
the local level. Although all the countries have taken steps to encourage formation of water 
users’ associations, in Uzbekistan water user associations are still in an infant stage (Bucknall et 
al. 2003, 4). Until the state extracts itself from the agricultural sector and allows for further 
liberalization in prices and removal of state control over markets and what can be grown, it will 
also be difficult to foster viable water user associations (For details, see Wegerich 2000).  
The one area outside of the agricultural sector, which has served as a source of economic growth 
in other transition countries and could provide alternative employment opportunities to cotton 
cultivation in Central Asia, is the development of small, medium, and micro enterprises. As of 
1995, the Uzbekistan government completed privatization of its small enterprises (World Bank 
2003, 12). Yet, despite contributing 15 percent of GDP, 5 percent of exports, and 9 percent of 
total employment in 2003, their growth in Uzbekistan was, nevertheless, “disappointing” (World 
Bank 2003, 3-4). Because of conflicting and burdensome regulations and a complicated tax 
system, numerous individual entrepreneurs have moved to the informal economy instead (World 
Bank 2003, 13). Only a few micro enterprises in Uzbekistan have experienced some growth, 
largely owing to the introduction of the simplified tax regime (World Bank 2003, Jones Luong 
2002). Similarly, only a few local NGOs in Tajikistan have provided alternative employment 
opportunities. For example, the National Association of Business Women in Tajikistan has 
distributed micro credits to women entrepreneurs (Jones Luong 2002). Rather, the small number 
of individual entrepreneurs in Tajikistan has also gravitated to the shadow economy (ICG 2003).  
 
Small-scale Conflicts 
 
Most donor efforts focused on water sharing at the interstate level immediately after the Soviet 
Union’s collapse. Yet, as the prospects for acute interstate conflict over water have faded, small-
scale water disputes still remain a major source of interstate tension and political instability (ICG 
2002). Because local stakeholders were not included from the onset in the efforts to build new   23
interstate water institutions, small-scale conflicts have continued to fester at the intrastate level 
and along the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan border and the Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan border. 
 
The Fergana Valley, in particular, is often cited as the region where small-scale conflict would 
erupt (Tabyshliev 1999). Although it only covers 5 percent of Central Asia, the Fergana Valley 
has the highest population density in Central Asia with over 10 million people. The Fergana 
Valley is also known for its strong agriculture base. Forty-five percent of the irrigation area of 
the Syr Darya basin, for example, is located within the Fergana Valley. It contains some of the 
most productive irrigated areas—such as Jalal-Abad and Osh in Kyrgyzstan; Andijon, 
Namangan and Fergana in Uzbekistan; and Khujand in Tajikistan--all of which rely upon the Syr 
Darya and its tributaries for irrigation.   
 
During the late 1980s, the Fergana Valley was also where most local water conflicts emerged. At 
that time, the conflicts were internal and localized, but with new borders, many canals that were 
earlier built to support agriculture throughout the Fergana Valley now cross political 
jurisdictions and have become a source of interstate tension over time. Thus, conflicts have 
transpired in border regions where water is shared such as between Tajiks and Kyrgyz along the 
border in the neighboring districts of Isfara in Tajikistan and Batken in Kyrgyzstan.  
 
The Fergana Valley is the most ethnically diverse region in Central Asia in which different 
ethnic groups are extremely intermingled. As a result, some have suggested that these water and 
energy disputes could provoke ethnic tensions in the Fergana Valley, especially between the 
ethnic Uzbeks, Kyrgyz and Tajiks who live in very close proximity with one another (ICG 
2002). Indeed, when Kyrgyzstan runs its hydropower plants during the winter months, the 
downstream populations in the Fergana Valley have experienced winter floods and summer 
droughts.  
 
The potential for local conflicts exists because of both the failure to build local capacity and the 
weakening of existing state institutions for water management (Bucknall et al. 2003, 7). Most 
donor programs (e.g., the World Bank, EU-TACIS, and USAID) were concerned with building 
national state capacity rather than enhancing local participation and local capacity building (e.g., 
local NGOs and community participation). In particular, most donor aid was directed toward 
reinforcing the new interstate institutions created for regional cooperation with the donors such 
as the IFAS (Weinthal 2002). For those populations in the disaster zones or on the farms, they 
were often unaware of the international activity that was taking place to improve water 
cooperation and to mitigate the Aral Sea disaster. Although the international community 
invested in some local projects, such as supporting water user associations and refitting local 
canals, most of the large multilateral organizations directed their assistance toward large-scale 
infrastructure projects such as a drainage collector in the Amu Darya Basin.  
 
Thus, despite such donor projects as the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation’s 
project to promote “Integrated Water Resources Management in Fergana Valley” 
(http://iwrm.icwc-aral.uz/index/i_en.htm), projects that have proposed regional cooperation in 
the Fergana Valley have faltered. Uzbekistan has often refused to participate in projects that deal 
just with the Fergana Valley since here it is clearly the dominant player due to its military and 
economic prowess along with having a large concentration of ethnic Uzbeks in the valley.   24
Moreover, given that much of the opposition to the Karimov government is based in the valley, 
Uzbekistan has fervently opposed projects that could potentially break down its system of social 
and political control.   
 
Even if donor programs could redirect their attention toward the local level, increasing NGO 
participation in water programs has become increasingly difficult, as the governments have 
introduced more and more restrictions on local NGO activity and donor funding has also 
diminished. Both local and foreign NGOs are required to officially register with the 
governments. The Central Asian governments, moreover, have increasingly restricted NGO 
participation in any political activity, and as a result, the large majority of NGOs shun direct 
confrontation with the government. There is also increasingly less Western funding available to 
support the efforts of local NGOs that have worked to address the Aral Sea crisis and that have 
served as conduits for building civil society in Central Asia.  
 
Central Asia’s Other Rivers 
 
Cooperation has also begun to emerge over some of Central Asia’s less well-known rivers. For 
example, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan signed an agreement in January 2000 on water use from 
the Chu and Talas rivers in Northern Kyrgyzstan that entered into force in 2002 (ICG 2002). 
Kazakhstan withdraws water from these two rivers for agricultural production. Since 2000, 
Kazakhstan agreed to pay Kyrgyzstan maintenance costs for the use of their shared water 
facilities on the Chu and Talas Rivers (World Bank 2004a, iv). This contrasts sharply with 
relations between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in the Syr Darya basin and may signal a shift in 
position in the Syr Darya basin since one of Kyrgyzstan’s demands is that the downstream states 
also contribute to maintenance of the upstream water installations.
11 This agreement also reflects 
a growing acceptance in international law that downstream riparian states should pay for water 
or water storage and regulation upstream (World Bank 2004a, iv). Here too, international 
organizations such as the OSCE have intervened to help establish a river commission to manage 
jointly these rivers (Blua 2003). 
 
The Irtysh River, although not part of the Aral Sea basin, has for decades been linked to the 
basin because of the controversial “Sibaral Project.” During the 1970s, Soviet water planners 
had proposed reversing the course of the Ob and Irtysh rivers so that they would flow from 
Siberia toward Central Asia to provide irrigation for cotton monoculture and to replenish the 
Aral Sea. Yet, in 1986 President Mikhail Gorbachev shelved the project owing to its exorbitant 
costs. The collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to reinforce the project’s defunct status. 
However, some interests in Uzbekistan including President Karimov along with some Russians 
have sought, albeit still unsuccessfully, to revive the water diversion scheme (Brown 2002). 
Unrelenting attention to this project continues to distract both the Central Asian states and the 
Russian Federation from working together to foster cooperation over their shared water 
resources in a way that is more ecologically and economically sustainable. 
 
                                                  
11 Yet, in 2003 a dispute over payments for water had arisen between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan in which 
Kyrgyzstan was demanding that Kazakhstan pay for the water it receives from the Chu and Talas rivers (30 June 
2003 RFE/RL).   25
Limited cooperation over the Irtysh River, however, has begun to emerge between the Russian 
Federation and Kazakhstan. On 27 August 1992, they signed an agreement over the use and 
protection of their transboundary waters that included the Irtysh and established a joint 
commission. Although China is a riparian, it was not part of this agreement, but rather signed a 
separate agreement on 12 September 2001 with Kazakhstan over the use and protection of their 
transboundary waters that include the upper tributary of the Irtysh (Black Irtysh) and the Ili 
(Blua 2004). This agreement also established a joint commission, which, however, is still seen to 
lack real policy-making authority (Blua 2004).  
 
These separate, albeit related, agreements have, nonetheless, failed to generate a common policy 
that takes into account the divergent interests and physical asymmetries among the riparians. In 
particular, China has plans to develop Xinjiang province in northwestern China, which requires 
increasing water withdrawals from both the Black Irtysh (a tributary of the Irtysh) and Ili River 
(Blua 2004). Xinjiang occupies one-sixth of the territory of China and forms a long border with 
Kazakhstan. China has directed enormous resources toward the expansion of the local economy 
and agricultural development in Xinjiang to encourage ethnic Hans to migrate westward to 
balance the large Muslim population of Uighurs that are closer akin to their neighbors in 
Kazakhstan. More so, increased water withdrawals are intended to help China develop the 
potential oil fields in the Tarim Basin in Xinjiang (Pannier and Magauin 1999). Kazakhstan 
would also like to use more of the Irtysh' s waters to expand development in its north and in the 
surrounding region near the new capital, Astana (Pannier and Magauin 1999).  
 
China’s plans to increase water withdrawals from the Irtysh and Ili upstream will directly affect 
Kazakhstan’s industrial, agricultural, and fishing sectors downstream (Blua 2004). At present, 4 
million people depend upon the Irtysh in Kazakhstan (Pannier and Magauin 1999); it is a main 
source of drinking water for the capital, Astana, and three large industrial cities in Kazakhstan -- 
Karaganda, Semipalatinsk and Pavlodar (Blua 2004). China’s construction of a canal to reroute 
water from the Irtysh to the Tarim Basin will lessen the amount of water available for many 
hydropower stations and factories located along the Irtysh and decrease water availability for 
agriculture in central Kazakhstan that is delivered via a canal from the Irtysh. At a minimum, 
China intends to increase its current use of the Irtysh’s water from approximately 15 percent to 
40 percent (Blua 2004). If China dramatically increases its withdrawals from the Ili, some 
speculate that Lake Balkhash might turn into another Aral Sea (Blua 2004).  
 
As in the other transboundary basins in Central Asia (e.g., the Syr Darya), water cooperation will 
undoubtedly be linked to energy issues. With one of the fasting growing economies in the world, 
China is in urgent need of new oil supplies. Thus, China is not only interested in exploiting its 
own energy reserves in Xinjiang province, but has actively sought to enter the oil and gas sector 
in Kazakhstan. China’s national oil company (CNPC) has signed several oil deals with 
Kazakhstan and has agreed to build an oil pipeline from western Kazakhstan to China. Thus, as 
in the Syr Darya basin, for cooperation to emerge, trade-offs will have to be made regarding 
water and energy. Some have suggested that China might argue that the water canal is vital for 
supporting the proposed oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to China (Pannier and Magauin 1999). 
Cooperation might also be linked to the issue of the Uighur population in Xinjiang, which also 
has a small minority in Kazakhstan. Specifically, Kazakhstan, as in the past, might agree to 
suppress Uighur nationalists in Kazakhstan that China views as a potential threat to political and   26
social unrest in China in exchange for increased water flows.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Water cooperation in Central Asia is still in its formative years. While the Central Asian states 
have successfully precluded violent conflicts from transpiring at the interstate level, a potential 
for conflict among the states still exists at both the interstate and intrastate levels, largely owing 
to the increasing large number of demands placed upon the region’s water resources. Whereas 
during the Soviet period, water use favored the cotton sector, independence created new 
asymmetries of interests and capabilities. Thus, for the Central Asian countries, neighboring 
states, and the international community to devise robust institutions for water cooperation, they 
will need to begin to think outside of the “water box” and situate the issue of water within the 
larger social, economic, and political context. Specifically, this will entail linking cooperation 
over water to energy and agricultural issues. It will also entail including Afghanistan, China, and 
Russia in negotiations over their transboundary water resources. In particular, for communities 
that lie along border regions, projects that promote cross-border cooperation will be essential, 
especially along the Afghanistan/Tajikistan border, for example. Nevertheless, there are also 
some steps that the Soviet successor states in Central Asia can take solely within the water sector 
to improve water management and consequently facilitate cooperation. These are briefly 
outlined below. 
 
At a minimum, the individual Central Asian states and the donors can invest in repairing the 
irrigation systems that have fallen into disrepair over the last few decades because of lack of 
investments or civil war, as in the case of Afghanistan and Tajikistan. For Afghanistan, donor 
aid could focus on completing the Kunduz-Khanabad Irrigation System, a project initially 
sponsored by the World Bank and the government of India, which provides water for rice 
cultivation in Kunduz (Gerstle 2004). Because only 28 percent of irrigation canals were lined in 
the Soviet successor states in 1994 (Micklin 2000, 29), much water is wasted before it reaches 
the fields. At present, only 21 percent of water applications are used and the remaining 79 
percent is wasted (World Bank 2004, 20). More so, many canals in Central Asia are silted and 
damaged, and in numerous instances the gates are broken or missing (Bucknall et al. 2003). The 
Central Asian states must also move away from the Soviet legacy of “bigger is better.” In 
particular, the grandiose project underway in Turkmenistan to build Lake Turkmen should be 
halted. Such projects are ecologically and economically unsustainable and likely to fuel conflicts 
with neighboring states. Rather, investments should be directed toward making the current 
irrigation networks more efficient. One study found that improvements in irrigation would 
contribute to expanding the per capita income for the poor (Bucknall et al. 2003). Without 
abetting the social and economic recovery of these disadvantaged populations, they might have 
no choice but to migrate to the cities in search of alternative livelihoods. There is already a fear 
that the Aral Sea crisis has spurred the onset of environmental refugees.  
 
Beyond the technical level, at the institutional level the Central Asian states must strengthen the 
interstate institutions for water management. Many have criticized the ICWC, in particular, for 
being beholden to the Uzbekistan water nomenklatura. Thus, for the new interstate water 
institutions to become viable, they will need to ensure that different interests from the different 
riparian states are represented equally. To begin, the Central Asian leadership should invite   27
Afghanistan to join the new interstate institutions. In order to advance Afghanistan’s economic 
recovery and improve the Aral Sea environment, the Central Asian states will also have to revisit 
the current quotas from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers. Initially, research will be needed 
to update data from Afghanistan since most of the current data is from prior to the Soviet 
invasion (Zonn 2002). Thus, donor assistance should also focus on improving technical expertise 
in Afghanistan, much of which has been lost over the last 20 years from internal strife.  
 
Although barter arrangements over water and energy exist for the Syr Darya basin, much more 
effort should be made to encourage the Amu Darya riparians downstream to take into account 
upstream demands for energy. By not linking energy and water, cooperation will continue to 
falter and at a minimum result in annual barter agreements that are negotiated ad hoc after a 
conflict has already erupted. Thus, there is a need to move from the conflict resolution stage to 
conflict prevention. In particular, the 1998 energy-water agreement that technically expired in 
2003 should be amended to prevent further conflicts from taking place.  
 
Integral to whether the Central Asian states will cooperate over water is the role of cotton that 
has still kept a large percentage of the population in an informal state of indentured servitude to 
the state. Broader reform is needed in the agricultural sector, which will undoubtedly have 
economic and social implications for the state. The governments – in particular, Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan -- need to diversify their agricultural sector and expand the role of private farms. 
Yet, this will both reduce the amount of revenue that accrues to the state from the sale of cotton 
and lessen the hold on the population at the farm level. While in the long-run, this will produce a 
more efficient agricultural sector, in the short-term, the leadership will be forced to address some 
highly volatile issues such as how to tax these individual farmers and how to expand the revenue 
bases in their countries. In short, the Central Asian states will need to invest in state building – 
that is, to build fiscal institutions that are broad-based and not solely dependent upon either the 
cotton or the oil and gas sectors such as in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (Jones Luong and 
Weinthal, forthcoming 2006). The lessening of price controls in the agriculture sector might also 
help to support the emergence of water user associations at the farm level. Combined, these 
changes might create a set of stakeholders that have an interest in sustainable water 
management.  
 
Because the Central Asian states are poor and weakly institutionalized, donor funding will still 
be needed to help them carry out any technical improvements and to build institutional capacity 
at both the local and international levels. Yet, the donors must work with the population at large 
and not just with the state elites. Whereas, immediately after independence, the donors were 
welcomed with open arms, they will most likely face greater resistance today from the Central 
Asian governments, as they fear that programs that encourage public participation and sweeping 
agricultural reform could create the conditions for societal opposition to emerge and challenge 
their increasingly authoritarian hold on power.  
 
Lastly, attention solely to the Aral basin has detracted attention from other potential conflicts 
such as in the Irtysh and Ili River basins. Thus, international donor activity needs to help 
establish a framework for cooperation over the Irtysh that will include both China and Russia, 
for example. Yet, as in the Aral Sea basin, the complex geopolitical history of the region   28
requires that any form of cooperation must be based upon situating the water question within 
broader economic and social issues such as energy and agriculture.  
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Appendix 1: Transboundary Rivers/Lakes in Central Asia (source: UNECE 2003) 
Transboundary 
River/ Lake 
Countries Concerned  Length of 
River, km 
Area of 
water 
basin/lake, 
10
3 km
2 
Water 
Discharge, 
m
3/s 
Agreement 
River Bolshoy 
Uzen 
Russian Federation/ 
Kazakhstan 
650  15,6    4 
River Maliy Uzen  Russian Federation/ 
Kazakhstan 
638  18,2    4 
River Irtysh  Russian Federation/ 
Kazakhstan  
4248  1643  2830  4 
River Ural  Russian Federation/ 
Kazakhstan 
248  231  400  4, 6 
River Tobol  Russian Federation/ 
Kazakhstan 
1591  426  805  4, 7 
River Ishim  Russian Federation/ 
Kazakhstan 
2540  177  56,3  4, 9 
River Volga (only 
east branches of 
Volga delta) 
Russian Federation/ 
Kazakhstan 
      4 
River Chu  Kazakhstan/ Kyrgyzstan  1067  6265  70  10 
River Talas  Kazakhstan/ Kyrgyzstan  661  52,7    10 
River Syr Darya  Kazakhstan/ Kyrgyzstan/ 
Uzbekistan/ Tajikistan/ 
Turkmenistan (note this 
is Aral Basin) 
 
Kyrgyzstan/ Uzbekistan  
2212 
(3019) 
219  446-703  1, 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
River Amu Darya  Kazakhstan/ Kyrgyzstan/ 
Uzbekistan/ Tajikistan/ 
Turkmenistan (note this 
is Aral Basin) 
 
Uzbekistan/ 
Turkmenistan 
1415  309  2000(?)  1, 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
River Zerafshan  Uzbekistan/ Tajikistan  877  1767  *{total 
discharge 
used for 
irrigation} 
1 
River Murgab  Turkmenistan/ 
Afghanistan 
978  46,9  52   
River Atrek  Turkmenistan/ Iran  669  27,3     
River Tejen  Turkmenistan/ Iran  1150  70,6  30 (from 
river head 
of the 
Argun) 
 
River Pjanj  Tajikistan/ Afghanistan  971  114  1000   
River Black Irtysh 
(Irtysh) 
Kazakhstan/ China        11 
River Ily  Kazakhstan/ China  1001  140  329  11 
   33
Appendix II: Water Agreements among Central Asia and with its Neighbors (Source: UNECE 2003) 
 
No.   Title of 
Agreement 
Field of 
Application 
River 
Basin  
Area of 
Application 
Signatories 
and/or 
contracting 
parties 
Date of 
Agreement 
and place 
of 
signature 
Joint body 
1  Agreement 
between the 
Republic of 
Kazakhstan, 
the Kyrgyz 
Republic, 
Republic of 
Uzbekistan, 
Republic of 
Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan 
on 
Cooperation in 
Joint 
Management, 
Use and 
Protection of 
Water 
Resources of 
Interstate 
Sources  
Regulating; 
Qualitative 
and 
quantitative 
protection of 
water 
resources, 
water supply, 
irrigation 
Basins 
of Amu 
Darya, 
Syr 
Darya, 
and 
Aral 
Sea 
All 
transboundary 
watercourses 
and lakes 
between the 
parties of the 
agreement, 
basin of the 
Aral Sea 
Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan 
Signed 
18.02.1992 
in Almaty 
 
Entered 
into force 
on the 
same date 
Inter-state 
Coordination 
Water-
management 
Commission 
(ICWC) 
2  Status of the 
Basin Water-
Management 
Joint 
Company 
“Amu Darya”  
Regulating of 
the use of the 
waters in the 
basin of Amu 
Darya  
Amu 
Darya 
Rivers, lakes, 
interstate 
channels, 
hydro-
technical 
installations in 
basin of Amu 
Darya 
Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan 
Signed 
06.04.1992 
at 
Ashgabat 
 
Entered 
into force 
the same 
date 
 
3  Status of the 
Basin Water-
Management 
Joint 
Company “Syr 
Darya”  
Regulating of 
the waters in 
the basin of 
the Syr Darya 
Syr 
Darya 
Rivers, lakes, 
interstate 
channels, 
hydro-
technical 
installations in 
basin of Syr 
Darya 
Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan 
Signed 
06.04.1992 
at 
Ashgabat 
 
Entered 
into force 
the same 
date 
 
4  Agreement 
between the 
Government 
of the Russian 
Federation and 
the 
Government 
of the 
Republic of 
Kazakhstan 
Qualitative 
and 
Quantitative 
Protection of 
Water 
Resources; 
Water Supply, 
Irrigation; 
Floods; 
Regulating 
Ob, 
Ural, 
Volga 
All surface 
waters and 
ground waters 
which form or 
cross the 
frontier 
between the 
two states 
include 
transboundary 
Kazakhstan 
and Russian 
Federation 
Signed 
27/08/1992 
at 
Orenburg 
 
Entered 
into force 
the same 
day 
Joint Russian-
Kazakhstan 
Commission 
on 
Transboundary 
Waters   34
concerning the 
Use and 
Protection of 
Transboundary 
Waters 
waters in the 
catchment 
areas of the 
Rivers Ishim, 
Irtysh, Ural, 
Tobol and 
Volga (eastern 
part of the 
delta) 
5  Agreement 
between 
Turkmenistan 
and Republic 
of Uzbekistan 
on 
Cooperation 
on Questions 
of Water 
Management 
Regulating of 
Water Use 
Amu 
Darya 
Basin of the 
River Amu 
Darya 
Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan 
Signed 
16.01.1996 
in 
Chartzjou 
BWO Amu 
Darya 
6  Protocol on 
Joint Use and 
Protection of 
Transboundary 
Water Bodies, 
Coordination 
of Water 
Management 
in Basin of 
River Ural 
Qualitative 
and 
quantitative 
protection of 
water 
resources; 
water supply, 
irrigation; 
floods; 
regulating 
Ural  Rivers Ural, 
Chagan, Or, 
Ilek, Khobda 
Russian 
Federation, 
Kazakhstan 
Signed 
20.06.1996 
at Kurgan 
Joint Working 
Group on 
Basin of River 
Ural 
7  Protocol on 
Joint Use and 
Protection of 
Transboundary 
Water Bodies, 
Coordination 
of Water 
Management 
in Basin of 
River Tobol 
Qualitative 
and 
quantitative 
protection of 
water 
resources; 
water supply, 
irrigation; 
floods; 
regulating 
Tobol  Rivers Tobol, 
Sintashti, Ayat, 
Upper-Tobol 
reservoir, 
Karamatarsky 
reservoir 
Russian 
Federation, 
Kazakhstan 
Signed 
20.06.1996 
at Kurgan 
Joint Working 
Group on 
Basin of River 
Tobol 
8  Agreement 
between the 
Government 
of the 
Republic of 
Uzbekistan 
and the 
Government 
of Republic of 
Kyrgyzstan on 
the Questions 
of Use Water 
Energy 
resources of 
Naryn Syr 
Darya’s 
Hydropower 
Regulating of 
use waters of 
Syr Darya 
taking in mind 
providing for 
vegetation 
watering 
Syr 
Darya  
Basin of River 
Syr Darya 
Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyzstan 
Signed 
25.12.1996 
in 
Tashkent 
BWO Syr 
Darya   35
Station 
Cascade in 
1997 
9  Protocol on 
Joint Use and 
Protection of 
Transboundary 
Water Bodies, 
Coordination 
of Water 
Management 
in Basin of 
River Ishim 
Qualitative 
and 
quantitative 
protection of 
water 
resources, 
irrigation, 
floods, 
regulating 
Ishim  River Ishim, 
Sergeevskiy 
and 
Petropavlovsky 
water-
engineering 
systems 
Russian 
Federation,  
Kazakhstan 
Signed 
26.06.1997 
at Pavlodar 
Joint working 
Group on 
Basin River 
Ishim 
10  Agreement 
between the 
Government 
of the 
Republic of 
Kazakhstan 
and the 
Government 
of Kyrgyz 
Republic on 
Use of 
Interstate 
Water 
Management’s 
Installations 
on Rivers Chu 
and Talas  
Regulating of 
use water 
management’s 
installations 
Chu, 
Talas 
Rivers Chu, 
Talas and 
water 
reservoirs on 
these rivers 
Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan 
Signed 
21.02.2000 
in Astana  
 
Entered 
into Force 
16.04.2002 
 
11  Agreement 
between the 
Government 
of the 
Republic of 
Kazakhstan 
and the 
Government 
of the 
Republic of 
China 
Concerning 
Cooperation in 
Use and 
Protection of 
Transboundary 
Waters 
Qualitative 
and 
quantitative 
protection of 
water 
resources 
Black 
Irtysh 
(Irtysh), 
Ily 
All surface 
waters which 
form or cross 
the frontiers 
between the 
two states, 
including 
rivers Black 
Irtysh (Irtysh) 
and Ily 
Kazakhstan, 
China 
Signed 
12.09.2001 
in Astana 
Joint 
Commission 
12  Decision made 
by the Heads 
of the Central 
Asian 
countries on 
“Main 
Directions of 
the Action 
Plan for 
Measures on 
complex 
water 
management, 
hydro-
technical 
installations; 
solving of 
social-
Rivers 
Amu 
Darya, 
Syr 
Darya, 
Aral 
Sea 
All 
watercourses 
and lakes of 
the Parties of 
the Decision in 
basin of the 
Aral Sea 
Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan 
Signed on 
06.10.2002 
in 
Dushanbe 
Existing joint 
bodies; ICWC, 
SDC, IFAS   36
Improving the 
Ecological and 
Social-
Economic 
Situation in 
the Aral Sea 
Basin for the 
Period of 
2003-2010 
economic 
problems; 
development 
of legal 
background of 
interstate 
organizations 
 
 
 